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ARGUMENT 
Cindy Young, Appellant herein, submits this brief in reply to the answer brief of 
The State of Utah (West Valley City or Prosecution) in this appeal. The prosecution 
raises three primary objections to Young's appeal: 
1. She presents as evidence, affidavits which are not admissible under the Utah 
Rules of 
Evidence. 
2. Young received the benefit of a vigorous and competent defense consisting of 
trial counsel's decisions involved trial strategy that were objectiveJy reasonable; 
3. The jury verdict was strongly supported. Alleged errors by trial counsel did not 
affect the outcome of the trial. 
Ms. Young agrees that she has only been able to present affidavits of most of the 
evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel at this stage of the proceedings. The trial 
court declined to receive testimony and this Court denied her motion for remand. Young 
has been denied the opportunity to put on competent evidence at an evidentiary hearing 
and this Court should either consider the affidavits or order the case remanded for the 
taking of evidence. Otherwise, Young cannot receive a fair trial an&or a fair appeal. 
Young respectfully disagrees that she received the benefit of vigorous and competent 
defense and that his alleged errors did not affect the outcome of the trial. It may have 
been vigorous, but it was ill fated from lack of preparation, knowledge and 
understanding of the facts to which the witnesses could and would testify in her defense. 
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Ms. Young does not disagree with the prosecution's citations of cases relating to 
the standard of review and the requirements for establishing ineffective assistance of 
counsel. She has stated those same standards for review and principles for this appeal in 
her opening brief. She does not disagree that defense counsel should be afforded some 
deference in making decisions as to how to conduct the trial. However, that deference 
has its limits which include having to adequately prepare and interview witnesses prior to 
trial, prior to die day of or commencement of the trial and be prepared with all of die 
information readily available to make decisions concerning strategy. Certainly, if counsel 
does not have adequate information or an accurate understanding of the case, counsel 
cannot make competent decisions of strategy. 
Ms. Young does not disagree that affidavits are not evidence and that hearsay is 
not usually admissible as evidence. However, the decision of the trial court not to hear 
evidence on her motion for a new trial and the decision of this Court to deny her Rule 
23(b) motion for remand, leaves her with nothing else to place before the Court. At least 
the Court should consider the affidavits in a light favorable to her in determining whether 
to remand the case to die trial court to take evidence. Denial of her Rule 23(b) motion for 
remand does not preclude such a result in this appeal. In State of Utah v. Bredehoft 966 
P.2d 285 (Utah App. 1998) this court considered affidavits for the purpose of determining 
whether to remand the case for the taking of evidence on a Rule 23 (b) motion. A remand 
in the appeal in chief should not be any different. Where there is merit the Court should 
consider die affidavits and remand the case if it appears from the affidavits that Ms. 
Young can put on evidence to support her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
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A. The Trial Court Should Have Allowed Testimony In Support 
of Young's Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. 
The prosecution argues that most of the evidence which Young asserts in support 
of her claim for ineffective assistance of counsel is not in the trial record; it is contained 
in affidavits and they are not admissible as evidence. Small wonder that the information 
in support of her ineffective assistance of counsel claim is only in affidavits. It is because 
that evidence was not presented in defense of her case a trial. That is why Young asserts 
that her counsel's representation in her defense was inadequate. Because of this, the 
information in die affidavits should be given careful scrutiny. 
This Court denied Young's Rule 23(b) motion for remand. It ruled Young did not 
show excusable neglect or in the Court's view, meet the procedural test, for the motion 
after the completion of briefing. However, Young had already approached die trial court 
for an evidentiary hearing on her motion for a new trial, a motion which the trial court 
denied and in die process declined to hold an evidentiary hearing. These denials speak 
well for the procedural niceties of the case. As a practical matter, they do not speak very 
well for the fair and substantive administration of justice as applied to Ms. Young.. 
What great harm could come from a short evidentiary hearing in the process of 
clearing this matter up before the court's turn their backs on her case? In view of the 
information in her affidavits and the arguments she makes in her opening brief, one can 
hardly believe there is not considerable substance to her claim. Indeed it fits well within 
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the holding of the Utah Supreme Court in State of Utah v. Kenneth Templin, 805 P.2d 
182, 149 Utah Adv. Rep. 14(1970), a case which is factually very close to the case at bar. 
B. The Prosecution's Arguments That Defense Counsel's Decisions 
Were Strategic Decisions and Were Objectively Reasonable are Mere 
Speculation and Are Not Themselves Supported By The Trial Record. 
The prosecution argues again and again that there is nothing in the record to 
support Ms. Young's factual contentions of what testimony would have been adduced had 
her counsel called other witnesses. How can Ms. Young point to such testimony in a 
record that is inadequate because her attorney did not put it into the record. The 
Prosecution argues the reason for EMT Glezo's being excused as a witness cannot be 
determined from the record. Ms. Young agrees. The prosecution then speculates that his 
testimony may have supported the injury to Officer's Lozano's hand. It refers to the 
testimony of Officer Lozano, the only reference in die trial record of what EMT Glezos 
said. He gave her a band-aid and instructed her how to treat them if her fingers had been 
injured as she claimed and which is hearsay in and of itself. In making this point the 
prosecution seems to assume that if Officer Lozano received an injury to her fingers it 
must have been done by Ms. Young. It fails to recognized that Officer Lozano could 
have received a wound, a superficial scrape as EMT Glezos would have described it, 
from her own exertions, from the key ring or the steering apparatus or even from the hand 
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cuffs she was putting on Ms. Young. 
If EMT Glezos had testified as represented by present counsel, which the 
prosecution seemed willing to assume for a slight point on page 14 of its brief, his 
testimony would not have supported the prosecution's case. It would have been that he 
did not see blood on her hand. He saw only a superficial scrape. This accords with die 
proposed testimony of Dr. Wallace Graham who saw only one recent wound in the 
pictures of Officer Lozano's fingers. Dr. Graham characterized the wound as a superficial 
scrap and not capable of being ascribed to a wound by fingernails as so vociferously 
argued by the prosecution at trial. It appears from the trial record as though a major part 
of the prosecution's case depended upon its convincing die jury that there were two very 
distinct wounds on two of the Officer's fingers which bled profusely. (See Young's main 
brief pages 18-20). His testimony would have contradicted that and would have 
definitely supported die defense. 
The prosecution continues and appears to argue that because there is nothing in the 
record to show why the tow truck driver was not called as a witness, it must have been 
because his testimony would not support the defense when it could have just as likely 
been that defense counsel did not have time during the break in the trial to interview him 
adequately. 
The prosecution argues that die failure to put on evidence of Officer Lozano's 
filing of a false charge against Young of violating a protective order could have led to the 
jury's learning that at one time, much earlier, Ms. Young slapped her daughter once 
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lightly on the mouth for unleashing a string of filthy oaths and names at her brother. The 
argument is it may have harmed her case in front of the jury. Of course whether that 
would have come out is conjecture and if it had, it was not Ms. Young did anything that 
was wrong and something to fear. It may have and would have just as likely led several 
of the jurors to compare their own experiences with children to that of the defendant. 
Under those circumstances engaging in similar conduct would those jurors view 
themselves as being likely to assault a police officer as Young was charged with doing? 
The prosecution attempts to dismiss with cursory comment, Ms. Young's 
contention that her attorney failed to discover and introduce any appreciable evidence 
about the effects of pepper spray by arguing that it occurred after the alleged attack upon 
the officer and is irrelevant. However, the prosecution overlooks the appreciable amount 
of testimony of Officer Lozano and Officers Moore and Kishiyama about the difficulty 
they had putting the handcuffs on Ms Young and the inference that it is continued 
resistance to arrest which goes to collaborate Officer Lozano's claim that Ms. Young 
assaulted her. Proper evidence about the effect so pepper spray would counter such an 
inference or impression by simply explaining why Young was flailing with her free hand 
as she was when the other officers arrived on the scene. 
The prosecution attempts to dismiss Ms. Young's claim that she was kneeling with 
her arms cuffed behind her as not being central to the prosecution's case. It was not, but 
why did the prosecutor make so much of it. It is very relevant to the credibility of Ms 
Young and to impeach the credibility of the police officers that EMT Glezos would have 
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testified that she was on her knees with her hands cuffed behind her when he arrived. 
The prosecution clearly used this little bit of testimony, which they now say was not 
central to their case, to try to discredit the credibility and the testimony of Ms Young. 
(Young appeal brief, p. 142) 
The prosecution argues that die jury1 s verdict is strongly supported by the 
evidence. That is so only because the whole truth was not put before the jury; it simply 
did not come out. The jury had to view the case with inaccurate, exaggerated and in 
some instances, untrue information. 
C. Young's Trial Counsel's Representation Did Not Meet 
The Standard For Objectively Reasonable Representation 
and Young Does Meet The First Part Of The Strickland Test 
To meet die first part of the test fort ineffective assistance of counsel Ms Young 
must show that the representation of her defense attorney did not meet an objectively 
reasonable standard of representation. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685, 104 
S. Ct. 2052 (1984) The prosecution raises several speculations as to why defense counsel 
may have done the tilings he did at trial. All kinds of speculation can be made about what 
caused defense counsel to make die decision he did at trial. However, one thing is clear, 
he did not interview the witnesses before the day of the trial and his interviews were 
cursory and did not uncover any appreciable detail about the facts of die case. Under the 
Supreme Court's holding in Templin., supra, p. That conduct cannot be characterized as 
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reasonably professional representation. 
The Templin case held that failure to interview witnesses prior to the day of trial 
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. In Templin, the Utah Supreme Court stated : 
If counsel does not adequately investigate the underlying facts of a 
case, including the availability of prospective witnesses, counsel's performance 
cannot fall within the "wide range of reasonable professional assistance." This 
is because a decision not to investigate cannot be considered a tactical decision. 
It is only after adequate inquiry has been made that counsel can make a 
reasonable decision to call or not to call particular witnesses for tactical reasons. 
State of Utah v. Templin, supra, 805 P.2d 182, , 149 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 16. 
That is precisely what happened in Ms. Young's case below when counsel failed, among 
many other things, to interview the witnesses before the commencement of the trial and 
then summarily 
dismissed EMT Glezos whose testimony was critical to her case. (Young's Appeal Brief 
pp. 20-23. 26-29) 
The prosecution attempts to distinguish Templin by arguing that in Templin, the 
defense counsel failed entirely to contact some of the potential witnesses whose names 
the defendant supplied to him. In this case Ms. Young's trial counsel failed to contact 
Grant Fairbanks, a plastic surgeon, with whom Ms. Yong had discussed the case and who 
expressed an interest in the case, and even requested that he be allowed to see the pictures 
allegedly depicting wounds on Officer Lozano's fingers. Counsel's performance during 
the trial reflects his failure to do that. 
In Templin, the Court noted that the fact that counsel interviewed or contacted 
some of 
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the witnesses did not excuse the fact that he did not contact or interview others. Further 
die Supreme Court in Templin noted that defense counsel failed to interview one of the 
other witnesses until the day of trial. It was not only the failure to contact some of the 
witnesses in Templin that caused the Supreme Court to overturn die case, It was the 
failure to find and use evidence available to the defense which would have been material 
tot he case. The Court there determined that the failure to call these witnesses resulted 
from inadequate preparation for trial. The Court stated that counsel's reliance on the 
defendant, Tempting, and his friend Johnson's testimony as "adequate information about 
the sexual activity between the defendant and the victim" was not a tactical decision 
which could be "characterized as reasonable professional assistance." Similarly trial 
counsel's decision to use only the Ms. Young and her neighbor Bobbi Johnson as 
witnesses of the circumstances around the arrest was not a tactical decision that can be 
characterized as "reasonable professional assistance" in the case at bar. Ms. Young has 
met the first part of the Strickland test. 
Trial counsel's failure to interview witnesses before the day of the trial is more 
than ample evidence of his inadequate preparation. As stated in Templin, only after an 
adequate investigation has been made can counsel make a reasonable decision to call or 
not to call a particular witness. The result of defense counsel's failure to make adequate 
investigation and trial preparation is set out in detail in Young's opening appeal brief. In 
view of die trial court refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing fairness would demand that 
all reasonable inferences from die affidavits should be drawn in Young's favor. If in 
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light of those inferences the evidence therefrom would have been likely to have been 
considered significant by one or more jurors, the matter should be remanded in the least 
for an evidentiary haring on her motion for a new trial. Only after that information has 
stood the scrutiny of an evidentiary hearing and reasonable steps taken thereafter can it be 
said that Young received a fair trial. 
D. There Is a Reasonable Probability That Defense 
Counsel's Failure to Adequately Interview Witnesses and 
Adequately Prepare For Trial Was Enough To Undermine 
Confidence in The Outcome Of The Prosecution's Case. 
Young Has Met The Second Part Of The Strickland Test 
The second part of the Strickland test requires that Ms. Young show her defense 
was prejudiced by counsel's failure to meet the objective test of reasonableness in his 
representation. 
Critical to any trial is the credibility of the witnesses. The only persons present at the 
time of the alleged assault on Officer Lozano were the officer and Cindy Young. The 
credibility of the testimony of each is critical to the outcome of the trial. The 
government's attack on die credibility of Cindy Young's testimony on rebuttal by going 
over again the difference in her testimony about the alleged wounds and blood on officer 
Lozano's fingers and about whether or not she was kneeling or sitting, could not have 
other than affected the decision of each juror. It made it appear to the jury that Ms. 
Young was not being entirely truthful in her testimony when in fact exactly the opposite 
was true. Had EMT1 Glezos testified that Ms. Young was kneeling with her hands cuffed 
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behind her as Ms Young herself testified and had he and Dr. Wallace Graham, or another 
expert medical witness, testified that there was only a superficial scrap on one, not two, 
of Officer Lozanofs fingers, that EMT Glezos did not see any blood on either Ms. Young 
or Officer Lozano, in other words, that there was not blood oozing all over the place it 
would have corroborated Ms. Young's testimony and would likely have had a dramatic 
affect on the perspective from which the jurors viewed the case. Had defense counsel 
been familiar enough with the case and with the pictures of the officers's fingers to point 
out to the jury that it was impossible for Ms. Young to make a half moon mark with her 
fingernails in the officers finger, it would have had monumental effect upon the jury's 
perception of the Officer's and Ms Young's credibility at trial. Further, introduction into 
evidence of the baseless charge of violating a protective order would have given the jury 
a glimpse into the state of mind of the arresting officer, Lozano; her agitation, her 
willingness to charge Ms. Young with a crime without looking carefully to determine that 
there was a factual basis. It would have allowed the jury to draw an inference that the 
arresting officer may have been as cursory and willing to bring any charge she thought 
she could find some reason, however slight, to bring and could have led to the jury's 
questioning the accuracy of officer Lozano's testimony at trial; that is to question or even 
doubt that Cindy Young actually assaulted her and dug her fingernails into the officer's 
fingers. It would have made alternative explanations of how the officer's fingers were 
wounded more viable. 
While the claim is now supported only by affidavit, if given the opportunity, there 
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is a very strong likelihood that Ms. Young can support the claims by solid evidence. 
Who could doubt that the above outlined information, if put to the jury, would 
undermine their confidence in the prosecution's case. This information indicates that the 
ineffective assistance of Young's counsel did prejudice her defense and that she has or 
can, if allowed to put on evidence, meet the second part of the Strickland test. 
CONCLUSION 
Young has shown, prima facie, by affidavit that she can meet both parts of the 
Strickland test Trial Counsel's representation did not meet the objective standard of 
reasonableness for effective representation. Her credibility before the jury was 
compromised and that of the police officers strengthened by misleading and inaccurate 
information. As a result, her defense was prejudiced. 
Young did not receive a fair trial; a fair consideration by an impartial jury based 
upon wholly true and untainted evidence. The trial court erred in not granting Young a 
new trial or in the least allowing her to put on the evidence shown to be available by her 
affidavits in support of her claim. 
The Court should overturn the jury's verdict of guilty. In the alternative, this Court 
should remand the case to the trial court to take evidence on her claim of ineffective 
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assistance of counsel at trial. 
Respectfully submitted Msp2 day ofMay, 2000. 
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